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 By PAUL W. RHODE AND KOLEMAN S. STRUMPF*
 This paper argues that long-run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent
 with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods (the
 Tiebout hypothesis). We develop an extension of the Tiebout model that predicts as
 mobility costs fall, the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good
 preferences and of public good provision must (weakly) increase. Given the secular
 decline in mobility costs, these predictions can be evaluated using historical data.
 We find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across (i)
 a sample of U.S. municipalities (1870-1990); (ii) all Boston-area municipalities
 (1870-1990); and (iii) all U.S. counties (1850-1990). (JEL D7, H7, N3, R5)
 In recent years there has been renewed em-
 phasis on decentralized governance in many
 countries including the United States. A key
 rationale for this shift is the belief that local
 governments provide policies better suited to
 citizen preferences. This wisdom is grounded in
 the Charles Tiebout (1956) hypothesis which
 states that individuals will costlessly sort them-
 selves across local communities according to
 their public good preferences. This simple the-
 ory is the workhorse of the local public finance
 literature and has been the subject of over one
 thousand economics and political science
 articles.
 Tiebout sorting remains an active current re-
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 search topic, with many recent papers taking a
 strict interpretation of the model. As examples,
 Dennis Epple and Holger Sieg (1999) and Epple
 et al. (2001) empirically model community
 choice as the product of costless sorting on
 housing prices and public good provisions.
 They estimate the underlying preference param-
 eters under the maintained hypothesis of a
 Tiebout equilibrium. Other recent empirical pa-
 pers have used the Tiebout framework to eval-
 uate the effects of school competition (Epple et
 al., forthcoming), school choice (Caroline
 Hoxby, 2000), or to explain the number of local
 jurisdictions (Alberto Alesina et al., 2000). The
 theoretical local public economics literature
 also relies heavily on the Tiebout framework
 and often presumes that community selection is
 driven exclusively by public goods and taxes.
 Some prominent recent examples include
 Raquel Femrnandez and Richard Rogerson
 (1998), Hoxby (1999), and Thomas Nechyba
 (1999, 2000), who consider education quality/
 spending; Jan Brueckner (2000), who analyzes
 local tax competition; Epple and Thomas Ro-
 mer (1991), who investigate redistribution;
 Myma Wooders (1999), who interprets Tiebout
 using cooperative game theory; Femrnandez and
 Rogerson (1997), who study the effects of zon-
 ing; and Nechyba (1997), Gerhard Glomm and
 Roger Lagunoff (1999), and Carlo Perroni and
 Kimberley Scharf (2001), who analyze generic
 local public goods.
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 Local policies clearly matter for residential
 choice, but are they the dominant motive? Sug-
 gestive evidence to the contrary comes from the
 American/Annual Housing Survey (AHS), a
 longitudinal, nationally representative survey of
 over 50,000 homes begun in 1973. Among the
 AHS households who moved in the previous
 year, only 5 percent cited public services (in-
 cluding schooling) as their primary reason for
 moving. Roughly 50 percent said their move
 was primarily due to employment or family and
 friends, motivations excluded in the Tiebout
 model and the literature cited above.' These
 results indicate that non-Tiebout incentives are
 important and perhaps driving forces in residen-
 tial decisions. If individuals select communities
 in large part due to employment or social inter-
 action opportunities, then neighbors need not
 have homogeneous public good preferences and
 one of the central implications of the Tiebout
 model is violated.
 This paper seeks to assess more formally the
 relevance of Tiebout sorting. Our strategy is to
 derive a more realistic version of the Tiebout
 hypothesis and empirically to test its implica-
 tions. We first generalize the Tiebout model by
 relaxing the assumption of perfect mobility (no
 moving costs). We show in a general environ-
 ment that as mobility costs fall, resident prefer-
 ence heterogeneity across communities should
 (weakly) increase. Under some standard as-
 sumptions on individual preferences, the varia-
 tion of policies across communities will also
 increase. The empirical section begins by doc-
 umenting the dramatic reduction in mobility
 costs over the last two centuries. This suggests
 that if Tiebout incentives are of first-order im-
 portance, then heterogeneity across communi-
 ties will increase in the historical record.2
 1 This result is quite robust. The motives behind moves
 are similar if we consider only within-metropolitan area
 moves; if we consider future moves by households who say
 their current local services are "so inadequate that they want
 to move"; or if we consider data reports from the Current
 Population Survey which includes migration data in 1945-
 1946, 1962-1963, 1974-1976, 1997-2000. All data sources
 and details on these calculations are contained in the Data
 Appendix, which is available at the authors' Web sites
 (www.unc.edu/-cigar/; www.unc.edu/-prhode/).
 2 An alternative cross-sectional test of the Tiebout pre-
 diction is to see if increases in mobility costs lead to reduced
 To evaluate this prediction, we consider: (i) a
 sample of U.S. municipalities over the 1870-
1990 period; (ii) all municipalities in the Boston
 metropolitan area over the 1870-1990 period;
 and (iii) all counties in the United States over
 the 1850-1990 period. Almost all of our em-
 pirical results stand in opposition to the Tiebout
 prediction of increasing heterogeneity across
 communities.3 Across the U.S. municipality
 sample, heterogeneity of local policy out-
 comes-total local taxes per capita and school
 taxes per capita-has declined significantly.
 The coefficient of variation for school taxes fell
 by two-thirds between 1880 and 1992. To test
 the comparative static prediction regarding
 preference heterogeneity, we consider proxies
 for public good preferences: race, age, and na-
 tivity, and over the 1970-1990 period, educa-
 tion, home ownership, and income. These
 proxies generally exhibit diminishing heteroge-
 neity across our municipality sample. For ex-
 ample, the dissimilarity index for the black
 population share decreased from 0.72 to 0.57
 between 1870 and 1990. We replicate our re-
 sults using all municipalities in the Boston met-
 ropolitan area because some argue the Tiebout
 model should apply to small geographic re-
 gions. Even with a greater variety of preference
 proxies and policies including electoral out-
 comes and education spending, there is little
 evidence of increased stratification (except for
 racial composition, but there is no change in
 suburban heterogeneity and the city-suburb dif-
 ferences appear likely due to discrimination
 rather than local public goods).
 stratification across communities. Using data for 65 large
 metropolitan areas in 1980 and 1990, we find higher commut-
 ing costs are associated with greater across-municipality
 heterogeneity (results available upon request). This is an
 important complement to our main results because it does
 not suffer from standard criticisms of long time series (e.g.,
 changes in the aggregate preference distribution or in the
 nature and type of local public services).
 3 These results run counter to the conventional wisdom
 that greater sorting has occurred in the latter part of the
 twentieth century. We show that most contemporary segre-
 gation occurs between neighborhoods (as measured by
 Census tracts) within the same municipality. Such neigh-
 borhoods receive roughly the same level of local public
 services, and so such within-municipality stratification is
 difficult to explain with the Tiebout model.
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 We next consider county-level data. While
 some researchers consider counties too large to
 be considered communities, we show empiri-
 cally that across-municipality heterogeneity is
 roughly equal to across-county heterogeneity
 plus a constant. This means that trends in
 across-county heterogeneity parallel trends in
 across-municipality heterogeneity. The advan-
 tage of using county-level data is that a wide
 range of variables is available for the full national
 population of counties. We assemble a vast data
 set comprising all of the counties in the United
 States (except Alaska) over the 1850-1990
 period. Our results confirm the municipal-level
 analysis. The dispersion of local policy outcomes
 across counties has declined significantly since
 the late nineteenth century. The coefficient of
 variation for local per capita education spending
 fell from 0.66 in 1890 to 0.25 in 1992. A similar
 reduction in heterogeneity occurred in per cap-
 ita taxes and revenues over the 1870-1992 pe-
 riod. We consider numerous proxies for public
 good preferences including religious affiliation.
 Almost every preference proxy exhibits dimin-
 ishing heterogeneity across counties since 1850.
 Two of the more graphic examples are that the
 proportion of blacks living in black majority
 counties decreased from 48 percent in 1890 to 9
 percent in 1990, and that the dissimilarity index
 of presidential vote shares decreased from 0.27
 to 0.17 between 1892 and 1988. These patterns
 are not solely driven by changes in the South,
 by rural-urban migration, or by reduced salience
 of our preference proxies.
 In total, these results suggest that Tiebout
 sorting has been historically overwhelmed by
 forces reducing across-community heterogene-
 ity. (A referee has noted that a closer examina-
 tion of the data indicates an even greater
 discrepancy between the historical record and
 the comparative static predictions of the gener-
 alized Tiebout model. Almost every heteroge-
 neity series declines most strongly over the late
 nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when
 the reductions in transportation and communi-
 cation costs appear most rapid.) These findings
 do not mean that Tiebout motives are irrele-
 vant, but rather that they have not been the
 primary factor in long-run location decisions.
 This implies that any theoretical or empir-
 ical model that adopts a pure Tiebout frame-
 work, as is common in the literature, is mis-
 specified. In more general models where
 nonpolicy factors influence residential choice,
 many implications of the Tiebout theory no
 longer hold (for example, it is not typically
 possible to rank communities according to pub-
 lic good demands).
 It is important to contrast our approach with
 previous empirical tests of the Tiebout hypoth-
 esis. Most papers investigate the extent of het-
 erogeneity within communities, the motives for
 household mobility, and the degree to which
 fiscal policies are capitalized into property value
 (see Keith Dowding et al., 1994). These papers
 do not provide a basis for evaluating whether
 Tiebout incentives are of first-order importance.
 For example, when considering community
 composition it is unclear how large a deviation
 from perfect sorting is needed before conclud-
 ing that non-Tiebout incentives dominate loca-
 tional choices. Our comparative static approach
 provides a more meaningful assessment of
 Tiebout's importance because it implies a direc-
 tion of change-to greater sorting-that is em-
 pirically refutable. We recognize that no single
 piece of evidence presented here is convincing
 by itself, but the absence of historical sorting
 trends among the dozen or so measures we
 analyze constitutes a serious challenge to the
 view that community choice is primarily driven
 by Tiebout incentives. Our work suggests that
 non-Tiebout motives must matter and that a
 more general approach is needed.5
 Our empirical results are of independent
 interest because they contribute to two current
 literatures. First, they advance the segregation
 literature, which explores the spatial disper-
 4 An alternative Tiebout test considers whether greater
 population heterogeneity leads to increases in the number of
 local governments (see Ronald Fisher and Robert Wassmer,
 1998, and the citations therein). But this literature is prob-
 lematic because the empirical results are weak with many
 insignificant and wrong-signed parameters, the direction of
 causality is unclear, and the results are consistent with
 alternative sorting motives such as racism (see Jorge
 Martinez-Vazquez et al., 1997).
 5 Among the motives deserving more consideration are
 preferences for neighbors (e.g., racial discrimination or eth-
 nic capital) and the role of employment (including commuting
 costs). Patrick Bayer (2000) improves upon the empirical
 literature by allowing residential choice to depend upon
 employment location and community racial composition.
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 sion of racial, religious, and ethnic groups.
 No other paper has explored segregation
 trends over such a long time period using
 such a wide variety of variables. Our analysis
 complements David Cutler et al. (1999), who
 study the segregation patterns of blacks in
 urban areas between 1890 and 1990. Our re-
 sults are also consistent with and extend Mi-
 chael Kremer (1997), who finds little change
 in across-tract heterogeneity in education
 over the 1960-1990 period. Second, our pa-
 per contributes to the growing literature on
 the efficiency implications of heterogeneity
 (e.g., Roland Benabou, 1996). Alesina and Eliana
 La Ferrara (2000) show that within-community
 heterogeneity empirically reduces participation
 in various social groups while Alesina et al.
 (1999) find ethnic diversity decreases local pro-
 vision of core public services like education.
 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (1999) find
 that variation in high school graduation rates
 across U.S. states at the beginning of the twen-
 tieth century was tied to the degree of religious
 heterogeneity. Our work provides new evidence
 on historical trends in several measures of com-
 munity heterogeneity.
 This paper is organized as follows. The
 next section extends the Tiebout model to
 include mobility costs and derives the theo-
 retical prediction that the remainder of the
 paper tests: as mobility costs fall, heteroge-
 neity across communities increases. Section
 II documents the long-run decline in selected
 measures of moving costs and Section III
 presents the empirical approach. Section IV
 investigates historical variation across munic-
 ipalities in local policies and in population
 characteristics that proxy for public good
 preferences. Section V extends the analysis to
 the county level. The final section discusses
 implications of our analysis. A Data Appen-
 dix listing the sources used in our analysis is
 available at the authors' Web sites.
 I. Adding Mobility Costs to the Tiebout Model
 This section develops a model in which com-
 munities provide public goods and individuals,
 who belong to types characterized by their pref-
 erences for public goods, choose communities
 subject to mobility costs.6 As in the original
 Tiebout model, there is no property or employ-
 ment, and communities cannot exclude individ-
 uals. We make no assumption about the initial
 distribution of types across communities.
 Setup.-Consider a population of N individ-
 uals, indexed by i, distributed across C commu-
 nities. Letting ci be the community containing
 agent i, call A = (c1, c2,..., Ci, ..., cN) the
 allocation of the N individuals over the C com-
 munities. Each community c provides public
 goods, Gc E F where F is a compact set. Gc can
 be a vector of local policies, each of which may
 be real valued (such as taxes and spending) or
 unordered and categorical (such as school cur-
 riculum contents).7 Denote the set of commu-
 nity public goods as G = (Gl, G2, ..., Gc).
 We will assume that agents only care about
 Gc in their community.8 Further assume that
 each agent belongs to a fixed type t character-
 ized by the continuous utility function, Ut(G).
 Let Gt be the unique ideal array Gc E F for type
 t, and presume there are T types where T < N.
 In some of the results derived below, we will
 consider special assumptions with a scalar pub-
 lic good. In order of increasing restrictiveness
 they are:
 ASSUMPTION 1: Single-peaked preferences:
 Gc E R and Ut(Gc) is a twice-differentiable
 concave function in Gc, where U't(Gc) < 0,
 6 Mobility costs have been added to other locational
 choice models. Some examples are William Carrington et
 al. (1996), David Wildasin and John Wilson (1996), Zvi
 Hercowitz and David Pines (1997), and John Kennan and
 James Walker (2000). These papers contain specific as-
 sumptions (such as treating government policy as fixed or
 presuming agents are identical) which preclude using them
 to generalize the Tiebout model.
 7 We implicitly have a bound on returns to scale in
 provision of government services. This is necessary to pre-
 clude formation of very large and heterogeneous commu-
 nities, which is also an issue in the original Tiebout model
 (see Truman Bewley, 1981, for examples).
 8 That is, individuals only care about public good provi-
 sion and not the characteristics of their neighbors. In prin-
 ciple, richer neighbors are more desirable because they
 contribute a greater tax share to the community budget
 constraint. The model implicitly rules out such income
 heterogeneity or presumes that only head taxes are possible.
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 Ut(Gc) > 0 for Gc < Gt, Ut(Gc) < 0 for G, >
 Gt, and Ut(Gt) = 0.9
 ASSUMPTION 2: Quadratic preferences:
 Gc E R and Utc = -(Gt - Gc)2.
 Social Welfare.-Define the aggregate mea-
 sure of social welfare for any allocation A and
 set of community public goods G as the sum of
 all agents' utility:
 (1)  W = cS,iUt,(Gc).
 The functional form of (1) is not essential and
 we discuss generalizations below.
 Community Decisions.-Suppose that each
 community c chooses its policy G* to maximize
 the sum of utilities of its current residents:
 (2) G*= argmax jUtj (Ge).
 Given our assumptions, G* exists. Note that
 some of the communities, z, may be empty,
 implying G* E 0. The functional form of (2) is
 not essential for our analysis; what is important
 is that (2) has a parallel structure to (1).10
 Individual Location Decisions and the Equi-
 librium Concept.-Assume that the agents can
 move in some sequential order, i.e., one indi-
 vidual at a time. This ordering may be deter-
 ministic or stochastic, as long as each agent's
 expected order in the sequence is finite. Refer to
 each agent's turn to move as her location deci-
 sion event. When her decision event occurs,
 agent i can change communities at the cost of
 9 Single-peaked preferences can be understood as an
 individual maximizing a utility function containing a public
 good and a private good subject to a budget constraint
 including a tax for the public good. See Thomas Romer and
 Howard Rosenthal (1977).
 10 (2) is used as a leading case. It is equivalent to ma-
 jority rule with side payments in a world with transferable
 utility. See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962, pp.
 190-92) for a rationalization of side payments and intuition
 about why they induce efficiency.
 m, units of utility. This "mobility cost" may be
 individual specific. 1
 Assume that the mobility decisions are myo-
 pic. That is, each agent i takes the prevailing
 policies, G, as given (thereby ignoring how her
 move affects the communities' decisions or
 causes other individuals to move) and only con-
 siders migrating to the community currently
 yielding the highest utility for her type. In the
 migration decisions, assume each agent treats
 any empty community as setting policies equal
 to her ideal.
 Definition of a myopic move: Under the myopic
 movement rule, agent i of type ti moves from
 community d to community c at her location
 decision event if and only if:
 (3) G*= argmax U, (G)
 where e is a generic community; and
 (4) Ut, (G) > Ut,(Gd + mi.
 In equilibrium, no individual will move when
 her decision events occur.
 Definition of an equilibrium: An equilibrium is
 an allocation A of individuals across communi-
 ties such that no agent would choose to move at
 her location decision event given her mobility
 costs, mi.
 Results.-Tiebout's famous claim is that if
 mobility costs are zero and the number of com-
 munities C is at least as large as the number of
 types T, then individuals of each type will sort
 themselves into homogeneous communities
 providing their ideal public good bundle. It is
 easy to show the following proposition, which
 captures the Tiebout Hypothesis.
 PROPOSITION 1: If C - T and policies are
 set via (2), then W is maximized when each
 community contains only one type.
 l We assume that mobility costs for individual i are
 constant across communities. The results below will not
 change if these costs vary with some measure of "distance."
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 Proposition 1 makes it clear that population
 heterogeneity within communities reduces wel-
 fare in the Tiebout model. This point can be
 further illustrated by the following example.
 Consider a model with quadratic preferences,
 Assumption 2. To maximize resident welfare
 via (2), a community c (with Nt residents of
 type t, making a total of Nc = StNtc) should set
 G* = Yt(Ntc/NC)Gt, the population-weighted
 mean of the ideal policies. Welfare per capita in
 community c, W/NC, will then equal the nega-
 tive of the population-weighted variance of the
 ideal policies:
 (5) W/Nc =-Yt(Ntc/Nc)(Gt- G*)2
 =-t(c/Nc)t2 + (Yt(Ntc/Nc)G)2.
 Per capita welfare in community c would be
 maximized if its population were homogeneous.
 In this example, the degree of within-community
 heterogeneity can naturally be measured by the
 population-weighted variance. In the general
 case, appropriately measuring the degree of het-
 erogeneity is more difficult. The important point
 is that in the Tiebout model social welfare is
 positively related to increased sorting (that is,
 lower within-community heterogeneity and
 higher across-community heterogeneity).12
 By assuming that preferences satisfy the single-
 peaked condition Assumption 1 and that public
 good provisions are set via (2), we can show
 that sorting is a self-reinforcing "increasing re-
 turns" process. The movement of an individual
 of type s increases the attractiveness of the
 receiving community-and reduces the attrac-
 tiveness of the sending community-for all type
 s agents. It has the opposite effects for some
 other types. (This is formally developed in the
 Appendix.) Even if other agents' mobility costs
 are fixed, the movement of a single agent can
 12 In the above example, total welfare is W =
 -tSt(G, - X)2 + XcNC(G* - X2 where X (ItNAGt)/N is
 the aggregate population-weighted mean type/equilibrium
 policy. The first term is constant for all allocations of a
 given population and the second term measures across-
 community heterogeneity of types (the variance of the com-
 munity mean types). A move from any allocation to perfect
 sorting increases W and, by the above expression, increases
 across-community heterogeneity.
 have cascading effects, inducing the movement
 of others. In general, the dynamics can be quite
complicated. The outcome depends upon the
 distribution of agents (their types and individual
 mobility costs) across communities and upon
 the specification of the sequential moving order
 (which may be stochastic). This complexity mo-
 tivates the myopic moving rule, which supposes
 an agent does not try to solve through the gen-
 eral equilibrium implications of her move on the
 subsequent public good provisions or the move-
 ments of others.13 An additional motivation is
 that in a large population, a single individual
 has a negligible direct effect on the provision of
 public goods.
 Proposition 2 shows that any myopic move
 has a positive effect on social welfare and, as a
 consequence, any reduction in mobility costs
 has a nonnegative effect on social welfare. No-
 tice that no special restrictions on individual
 preferences are needed for this result.
 PROPOSITION 2: When individual moves
 obey (3) and (4) and policies are set via (2),
 (a) Any individual move strictly increases W
 (and does so by more than the mover's
 costs, mi).
 (b) If mi falls, then individual i either stays or
 moves and if she moves, then W increases.
 The moving process yields a new equilib-
 rium with a higher W.
 PROOF:
 (a) Suppose that individual i moves from com-
 munity d to c. The utility of three groups of
 agents will be affected. First, the net effect
 among residents of community d except i
 (k/i) is,
 (6) k/li[Utk(GIi) - Ut(G)] 0
 where the inequality follows from the defi-
 nition of argmax in (2). The intuition is that
 a community cannot be made worse off by
 adjusting G to maximize the welfare of its
 13 For a sense of the complexity of this process, see Ken
 Kollman et al. (1997).
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 current residents. The remaining residents
 of d (excluding i) are, by definition, at least
 as well off in aggregate under G*/i as under
 G*. We call this the argmax argument.
 Second, the net effect among the initial
 residents of community c (j/i) is,
 (7) ji[WU(G*+i) - Utj(G)] < 0
 where the inequality follows from the defi-
 nition of argmax in (2). Finally, the effect
 on agent i has two components. From her
 myopic comparison of d and c,
 (8) Ut,(G *)- Uti(G) - mi > 0
 where the inequality follows from (3) and
 (4). The other component considers how her
 move will change G in c,
 (9) Ut(G*+i) - U,(G- .
 But (7) + (9) equal,
 (10) j/i[Uj (G*+) - Utj(Gc)]
 + Ut,(G*+ i) - U,J(G*
 = j[Ut(G*+i) - VU,(Gc] ? 0
 by definition of the argmax in (2). The
 intuition for (10) follows the argmax ar-
 gument. In aggregate, the residents of c
 (including i) are at least as well off under
 G*+i as under G*. The change in Gc may
 harm its initial residents, but the gain to i
 must more than offsets their losses; oth-
 erwise, G*+j would not be selected by a
 community setting policies according to
 (2).
 Thus the total effect (6) + (7) + (8) +
 (9) is positive. This implies that welfare
 net of moving costs, W - mi, increases,
 and therefore, W increases.
 (b) If agent i moves, this may induce others to
 migrate. By part (a), no matter how many
 moves occur, W increases. This process
 must end in a finite number of moves (that
 is, there exists an equilibrium) because
 there are a finite number of possible alloca-
 ions and each agent's expected order in the
 location decision sequence is finite. No al-
 location can reoccur because W is strictly
 increasing with each move. D
 Three comments are in order:
 (i) Proposition 2 also holds in a world of
 Leviathan governments where G is fixed.
 Here, (6), (7), and (9) are each zero, but (8)
 is positive by (3) and (4).
 (ii) More generally, the basic results hold if the
 social welfare function (1) weakly reflects
 individual preferences (as in W = F(U1,
 U2,..., UN) with F'; 0), and in (2) each
 community maximizes its residents' wel-
 fare (as measured by this W).
 (iii) The myopic moving rule, which implies
 that (8) is positive, plays a key role in
 Proposition 2. Suppose instead that indi-
 viduals are forward looking and move if
 (8) + (9) is positive. If (8) is negative, then
 in principle (6) + (7) + (8) + (9) could be
 negative and the proposition does not hold
 (W may decrease).14
 A further issue of interest is how a reduction
 in mobility costs affects the distribution of pol-
 icy outcomes. Because it is difficult to define
 variation in multidimensional space, we focus
 on cases with scalar public goods.
 OBSERVATION: Under Assumption 1 with
 C = T = 2 or under Assumption 2, when local
 14 In general, mobility inherently involves externali-
 ties, both positive and negative. Under the myopic move-
 ment rule, an individual moves only if the receiving
 community is ex ante preferable. This means that any
 move that benefits the individual also benefits society on
 net; that is, the benefits received by the mover and the
 other residents of the sending community exceed the
 costs imposed on existing residents of the receiving com-
 munity. Under the nonmyopic rule, an individual may
 find moving beneficial simply because it makes the re-
 ceiving community closer to her own tastes (ex post).
 This can impose costs on its existing residents that are
 greater than the benefits that mover and the other mem-
 bers of the sending community enjoy. Note that under
 either the myopic or nonmyopic rules, there may be
 socially beneficial moves that are not made when the
 private benefits fall short of the mobility costs.
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 policies are set via (2) then individual moves
 which obey (3) and (4) lead to increased vari-
 ation of policy outcomes across communities.
 A formal demonstration of the result is con-
 tained in the Appendix.15 Consider first the case
 of single-peaked preferences, Assumption 1,
 when C = T = 2 holds. In this case, a commu-
 nity's policy will be the weighted average of the
 two types' ideal policies where the weight on a
 type's preference depends positively on its pop-
 ulation share. Any myopic move will widen the
 difference in policies between the two com-
 munities by pushing the policy in the receiving
 (sending) community toward (away from) the
 mover's ideal G. Now consider the second case
 which assumes quadratic preferences, Assump-
 tion 2. Under (2) and Assumption 2, the policy
 in a given community is the mean of residents'
 ideal G's and the aggregate population-weighted
 mean policy is independent of the distribution
 of types across communities. Any move obey-
 ing (3) and (4) will widen the difference in
 policies between the sending and receiving
 communities, increasing the total population-
 weighted variance of policies.
 To summarize, the theoretical model devel-
 oped in this section extends the Tiebout
 framework to include mobility costs. Our re-
 sults, while somewhat novel, are clearly in the
 spirit of Tiebout's argument. Mobility costs
 may prevent individuals from sorting into ho-
 mogeneous communities of their own type-
 the allocation that maximizes social welfare.
 A reduction in mobility costs has a nonnega-
 tive effect on social welfare. This implies
 falling mobility costs increase heterogeneity
 across communities. We also find that sorting
 increases the variation of local policy out-
 comes under several variants of the model.16
 15 The observation also holds for generic preferences
 when the population is initially completely diffuse, imply-
 ing policies are identical across communities. Moving to
 any level of greater sorting, the variation of policies across
 communities will be weakly greater, and in the fully sorted
 equilibrium, the variation will be strictly greater.
 16 Note that these results depend on the Tiebout assump-
 tion that residential choice is based only on public good
 provision. If individual resident decisions weigh factors
 (employment, proximity to family, amenities) not perfectly
 correlated with preferences over Gc, then reduced mobility
 The remainder of the paper tests these predic-
 tions empirically.
 II. Documenting Declining Mobility Costs
 The conventional wisdom holds that mobility
 costs have fallen over time.17 Yet constructing a
 comprehensive measure to document this "tru-
 ism" is difficult. Anyone who has relocated
 knows that out-of-pocket expenditures repre-
 sent only a fraction of the costs of moving. As
 human capital theory suggests, these costs in-
 clude the lost work time-organizing before
 departure, traveling, and getting back up to
 speed at the destination. Given that real wages
 have generally risen, the value of this lost time
 would be increasing. However, several oppos-
 ing forces more than offset this effect. Improve-
 ments in transportation and the increased
 similarity of regional cultures mean less time is
 now lost in the move. During the colonial pe-
 riod, the rigors of the transatlantic travel and the
 effects of exposure to a new disease environ-
 ment were purportedly so severe that newly
 imported slaves and indentured servants re-
 quired six months to two years to achieve pos-
 itive levels of net output (David Galenson,
 1996). Few migrants suffer such a loss today.
 The available evidence suggests that over the
 past one-and-one-half centuries, the reduction
 in direct travel time has more than offset the
 increase in the value of labor.18 In addition, as is
 costs need not induce greater Tiebout sorting. Indeed, given
 the policy rule (2), migration for non-Tiebout reasons may
 reduce the variation of G and dampen Tiebout incentives to
 migrate.
 17 To perform our comparative static exercise, an ex-
 ogenous reduction in mobility costs is needed. While
 much of the transportation infrastructure (such as high-
 ways and airports) involves endogenously determined
 public goods, the reduction in transportation and com-
 munications costs was in large part a product of techno-
 logical improvements (in steam and internal combustion
 engines, communications equipment, and production
 techniques).
 18 Between 1857 and 1999, the time required to
 travel between New York and Chicago has fallen from
 2 days to less than 2 hours 40 minutes, or by a factor
 of 18; that for a trip between New York and Los Angeles
 has fallen from about 3.5 weeks to less than 8 hours, a
 factor of 75. The time for short-distance trips has also
 sharply decreased: the average automobile speed in 1970 is
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 FIGURE 1. REAL TRANSPORTATION COSTS
 argued below, communication improvements
 have reduced one of the key costs of moving,
 the lost contacts with one's friends and family
 in the home community.
 There is clear evidence that physical moving
 costs have fallen over the last century. (In the
 interest of brevity, all sources are contained in
 the online Data Appendix.) The most obvious
 change is the spread of the personal automobile.
 In 1900, there was roughly one passenger car
 for every 10,000 Americans; today, the ratio is
 nearly one car for every two. This change was
 due in part to sharp reductions in the costs of
 owning and operating automobiles. The careful
 calculations of Hiram P. Maxim (1904), a lead-
 ing engineer, showed driving costs in 1903
 equaled 143.8 cents per mile in 1998 dollars.
 The American Automobile Association esti-
 mates that the full cost of driving the more
 reliable, comfortable cars of today aver-
 ages 54.9 cents per mile. As the fragmen-
 tary data on automobile costs per mile
 (excluding finance charges) presented in Figure
 roughly 12 times the stage speed in 1840. Average real labor
 returns have increased between five- and sevenfold over the
 1860-2000 period.
 1 indicate, most of this decline occurred before
 the Second World War. Also facilitating the
 spread of the personal car were massive invest-
 ments in the nation's system of public roads,
 nearly doubling its mileage from 2.3 million in
 1900 to almost 4 million today.19 An important
 consequence of the spread of the automobile
 was to weaken the link between work and res-
 idence locations, potentially allowing greater
 Tiebout sorting.
 Improvements in trains and airplanes have
 also significantly lowered mobility costs. As the
 series in Figure 1 reveal, the real cost of railroad
 service was about one-third as expensive in
 1995 (13.4 cents per passenger mile) as it was in
 1895 (37.4 cents). The real cost of air travel also
 fell sharply, with average airline revenues per
 passenger-mile dropping from about 108 cents
 in 1929 to 13.7 cents by 1995 (rough parity with
 19 This growth in mileage understates the true im-
 provement in transportation access because most early
 roads were little more than dirt pathways. In 1904, for
 example, "surfaced" roads made up less than 7 percent of
 total mileage. The first coast-to-coast auto trip across
 North America, completed in 1903, purportedly took
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 railroads). In addition, the speed of air travel
 nearly tripled since the early 1940's.
 We also know that the real cost of moving
 household goods has fallen substantially. Circa
 1995, the real rate per ton-mile for a private
 COD shipment by a household goods carrier
 averaged 57.8 cents, which is far less than the
 88.1 cents charged a decade before. Tariff
 schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce
 Commission indicate that the real rate per ton-
 mile for a "modem" shipment was approxi-
 mately 147 cents in 1936, implying costs have
 fallen by over 60 percent between 1936 and
 1995.20 The costs of local moves have declined
 as well. For example, when L. S. and Anna
 Shoen established the U-Haul Co. in 1945 at
 Ridgeway, WA, they charged $2 per day for a
 small trailer. Today renting such a trailer at 1-5
 Auto Sales near Ridgeway (or at many of the
 firm's other 15,000 retail locations) would cost
 $9.95 or about 40 percent less in real terms.
 Long-run movements in communication
 costs reveal similar trends. This is important for
 several reasons. Lower communication costs
 improve information flows about other regions,
 reducing uncertainty. In addition, they allow
 migrants to maintain contacts with friends and
 family "back home." Finally, easier communi-
 cation encourages more dispersed production
 activity, implying people are less tied to a par-
 ticular community for employment reasons.
 Figure 2 shows the real costs of making three-
 minute daytime telephone calls from New York
 to Chicago and San Francisco have fallen al-
 most continuously. To place a three-minute
 transcontinental call in January 1915 (when ser-
 vice first became available) cost $20.70 in cur-
 rent dollars, which was almost $314 in 1998
 dollars. The real cost of such a call in 1995,
 even at ATT residential daytime rates, was less
 than three-tenths of one percent as high.21
 20 It appears that the average weight of shipments has
 also risen, climbing from somewhat under two tons in the
 early period to three tons today, but this proportional increase
 is less than the fall in rates and is of course endogenous with
 respect to the price decrease. Over the 1994-1996 period,
 the average billed shipment weighed just under three tons
 (5,919 pounds) and traveled 1,261 miles.
 21 The reduction in postal rates, especially across coun-
 try, was also notable. In 1860, during the Pony Express
 These falling mobility costs have appar-
 ently set more Americans on the move. In
 1940, about 11 percent of the American pop-
 ulation (five years and older) had lived in a
 different county five years earlier. This frac-
 tion increased to 17 percent in 1970 and to 19
 percent by 1990. Another useful measure of
 long-run mobility rates is the percentage of
 the native population residing in their state-
 of-birth. In 1870, almost 77 percent of the
 native population resided in their state-of-
 birth. Since 1900, the fraction has continu-
 ously fallen, with the most rapid rate of
 decline occurring during the 1940-1970 pe-
 riod. By 1990, only about two-thirds of the native
 population resided in their state-of-birth. Today's
 migration rates appear sufficiently high to allow
the American population to achieve significant
sorting across local jurisdictions according to pol-
 icy preferences, if they so desired.22
 III. Empirical Implementation
 Given the secular decline of mobility costs,
 a natural test of the predictions of the gener-
 alized Tiebout model is to examine historical
 trends in the dispersion of local fiscal out-
 comes and in the sorting of population types
 across localities. While it is not clear how to
 define Tiebout's canonical community, the
 most natural definition is the municipality or
 the Census minor civil division (MCD). Un-
 fortunately, electronic versions of compre-
 hensive MCD-level data are not available
 before 1970. Instead we created a random
 10-percent sample of counties and entered
 data for all MCDs in these counties for the
 earlier years.23 We investigate heterogeneity
 period, it cost $10 to send a one-ounce letter between New
 York and San Francisco. By 1886, the cost fell to two cents
 in the currency of the day.
 22 Consider a population composed of two equally sized
 groups that are initially evenly distributed across two regions.
 If 4 percent of the population moved every year in accordance
 with Tiebout "voting with their feet" thinking, the regions
 would be completely segregated within 12.5 years.
 23 We cannot directly sample from the population of
 MCDs since there is no historically consistent listing of all
 municipalities. We entered information for years prior to
 1970 where the Census tabulated MCD-level data. The
 years with coverage of all MCDs are: 1870 (demographics
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 FIGURE 2. REAL COST OF A THREE-MINUTE PHONE CALL
 trends across this MCD sample. Because
 some argue that Tiebout sorting only ap-
 plies over limited geographic areas, we next
 extend the analysis to the full set of munici-
 palities in the Boston metropolitan area.24
 Finally, we present additional results using
 the full set of U.S. counties. One potential
 complication is the growing number of mu-
 nicipalities and counties. This is mainly due
 to territorial division, which will lead to in-
 creases in our across-community heterogene-
 ity measures even in the absence of individual
 movement (see Rhode and Strumpf, 2000, for
 details).25
 The analysis investigates trends in across-
 community heterogeneity of policy variables
 and proxies for public good preferences. (De-
 only); 1880, 1890 (government finances only); 1930, 1940,
 and 1960 (demographics only). We have data for all years
 but 1940.
 24 We also explore more broadly whether sorting oc-
 curs over small geographic areas in the entire United
 States. Our analysis indicates that heterogeneity across
 adjacent communities has tended to remain flat over time.
 (The results are based on county-level data and are avail-
 able upon request.)
 25 Because this is the direction of change that the Tiebout
 model predicts, finding empirical evidence of reduced sort-
 ing would be strong evidence against the model.
 tails on the availability, precise definition,
 and sources for all variables are presented
 in the online Data Appendix.) Our local pol-
 icy variables are per capita taxes and ex-
 penditures.26 Taxes are a measure of the over-
 all level of government activity; we con-
 sider both overall and school taxes. We also
 examine spending on education and protec-
 tion (police and fire), the most prominent
 local services. For these policy variables, two
 heterogeneity measures are calculated, both
 of which increase with dispersion across gov-
 ernments and control for changes in mean
 levels. The first measure is the population-
 weighted coefficient of variation (CV), which
 is the ratio of the standard deviation to the
 mean,
 (11) CV= G- (~jPj(Gj - G)2)05
 where Gj is per capita taxes/revenues/spend-
 ing for government j, G is mean per capita
 taxes/revenues/spending for all governments,
 26 Richard Ely (1888) contains a detailed discussion of
 the development and historical comparability of our taxa-
 tion measures.
 1658  DECEMBER 2003
 RHODE AND STRUMPF: THE IMPORTANCE OF TIEBOUT SORTING
 and Pj is the share of total population in
 government j. The second measure (DG) cal-
 culates the proportion of total taxes/revenues/
 spending in each year which would have to be
 reallocated across governments to yield a uni-
 form per capita distribution (this is related to
 the dissimilarity index which is discussed
 below),
 (12) DG- G-'Y-jPjlG - G|.
 Because preferences are not directly observ-
 able, we adopt the strategy of examining numer-
 ous characteristics that proxy for individual
 types.27 For each characteristic, we partition the
 population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive
 categories. Our proxies are admittedly imperfect
 measures of the true types. But as an earlier ver-
 sion of the paper (Rhode and Strumpf, 2000)
 shows, even if the observable characteristics are
 noisy signals or available categories are too
 coarse, our measures of population heterogeneity
 remain informative.28 This version also shows that
 the proxies retain their salience over time (in year-
 by-year regressions using the proxies to explain
 variation in local policy or election outcomes, the
 R-squared's do not trend down) and that the trends
 in heterogeneity across communities are not ex-
 clusively the result of the shift from a rural to
 urban society.
 We consider the following proxies when
 available:
 27 An ideal test of our model would involve construction
 of multidimensional measures of individual types (i.e., us-
 ing the characteristics discussed below as inputs in a hedo-
 nic model of type). However, this would require detailed,
 individual-specific information about all persons living in a
 given local jurisdiction. Such data simply do not exist for
 the modem era.
 28 There is also evidence that several of our type
 measures are transmitted from parents to children.
 Thomas Piketty (1995) cites the extensive literature
 showing that political preferences have an important he-
 reditary component even after controlling for income and
 social class. Frank Newport (1979) finds that in the
 mid-1970's over two-thirds of individuals maintain their
 childhood religion. Kremer (1997) shows there is a high
 rate of transmission of parental education to their chil-
 dren using the PSID (he also surveys work documenting
 the intergenerational transmission of many other charac-
 teristics considered here).
 * Race: It is often observed that members of
 racial groups share economic interests and
 maintain strong common political affilia-
 tions. For example, the General Social Sur-
 vey (GSS) reports 39.3 percent of blacks
 (N = 1,864) identify themselves as
 "Strong Democrats" while only 12.5 per-
 cent of whites (N = 3,675) do so.29 There
 are also notable racial differences in the
 GSS over political ideology and attitudes
 towards government redistribution. We use
 the black population share to proxy for
 these beliefs.
 * Age categories: The young population share
 (those between 5 and 20 years old) proxies
 for families with children; such households
 presumably prefer higher spending on local
 schools. The old population share (those at
 least 65 years old) is used, since the elderly
 should be less likely to favor education
 spending.30 These variables should reflect
 life-cycle sorting.
 * Nativity: The foreign-bom represents another
 distinctive population with important ramifica-
 tions for local politics (e.g., school curricula).
 Note that interpreting trends for the foreign-
 born share is complicated because immigrants
 may sort across communities for non-Tiebout
 motives, for example, to take advantage of so-
 cial networks or ports of entry.
 * Party vote shares in presidential elections:
 Individuals presumably vote for the party
 whose platform is closest to their own ideal
 policy, implying those voting for a particular
 party have similar preferences.31
 29 The General Social Survey (1999) is a micro data set
 of individual attitudes collected over the 1972-1996 period.
 30 There is also some support from the GSS that age
 g oups have distinct political beliefs. For example, while
 5.8 percent of those aged 18-20 (N = 1,181) consider
 themselves "Strong Republicans," 16.8 percent of those
 aged 75 or older (N = 2,311) do. The GSS also indicates
 that similar age differences exist for the appropriate level of
 education spending.
 31 If all individuals in a community vote for the same
 party, the community is composed of like-minded residents
 and is sorted in the Tiebout fashion. If the residents split
 their votes, the community has not been sorted. It is impor-
 tant to notice that this measure only makes sense for elec-
 tions over national office. This is because party platforms
 are strategically set with the objective typically being vote
 maximization. Even relatively homogeneous areas may split
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 * Religion: Individuals affiliated with a partic-
 ular religion share their faith's set of beliefs,
 values, and cultural traditions and are, there-
 fore, likely to have relatively similar policy
 preferences.32 In the GSS, 26.5 percent of
 self-identified religious fundamentalists
 (N = 162) and 23.1 percent of evangeli-
 cals (N = 208) consider themselves to be
 "Strong Republicans" while only 4.5 per-
 cent of religious liberals (N = 265) do so.
 One of the advantages of using religious
 affiliation is that it allows a fine partition of
 the population: we can employ up to 27
 denominational families.
 * Homeownership rates: Homeowners are typ-
 ically wealthier and have greater civic in-
 volvement in the community.33
 * Education: Educational attainment is likely
 to be related to income, wealth, and attitudes
 toward government.34 We use three groups:
 less than a high school degree, at least a high
 school degree but not a college degree, and a
 college degree or more.
 * Income: This is the most natural measure of
 type. Unfortunately, the Census did not begin
 reporting data on local income distribution
 until 1949. Categorical information is avail-
 their vote on local offices because the local party platforms
 are likely to be quite similar. For national offices, however,
 parties are likely to set their platforms in a way to split the
 national vote. Individuals in a relatively homogeneous area
 are likely to have similar preferences over national parties,
 and so they will cast their votes for only one party.
 32 Based on the 1990 National Election Study, David Leege
 and Lyman Kellstedt (1993) show that affiliation with many
 of the denominational families used in our analysis are
 strong predictors of individual voting behavior and ideolog-
 ical preference. Laurence lannaccone (1998) suggests that
 the link between religion and politics is largely limited to
 moral and social issues such as school prayer and abortion.
 However, he only focuses on evangelical-fundamentalist
 Protestants. Mark Noll (1990) also documents the historical
 link between religion and politics using largely nonquanti-
 tative analysis.
 33 See Robert Carroll and John Yinger (1994) and Denise
 DiPasquale and Edward Glaeser (1999).
 34 In the GSS, of those with less than a high school
 education (N = 9,391) 15.2 percent earn $25,000 or more
 and 25.4 percent think welfare benefits are too low. For
 those with only a high school degree (N = 20,368), the
 values are 40.5 percent and 17.6 percent; for those with a
 college degree or more (N = 7,632), the values are 63.2
 percent and 16.7 percent.
 able for both families and households (which
 include unattached individuals). The Census
 lists 14 income groups in 1949, 15 income
 groups in 1969, 17 income groups in 1979,
 and 25 groups in 1989.
 To ensure robustness we employ several het-
 erogeneity measures for our proxies. For vari-
 ables with discrete types, the dissimilarity index
 and the Gini coefficient are used.35 These mea-
 sures, which are commonly used in the segrega-
 tion literature, have three important properties.
 First, they vary between zero (when each type is
 equally represented in each community) and
 one (when the types are completely segregated).
 Thus a higher value indicates greater heteroge-
 neity across communities. Second, they are nor-
 malized to control for the changing proportions
 of types in the aggregate population, implying
 they are unaffected if the groups grow at differ-
 ent rates nationally.36 Third, the measures
 weight the communities by their population. In
 multiple (-2) type comparisons, the dissimilar-
 ity index, D, and the Gini coefficient, GC, are
 defined as:
 (13) D tY-jNjj|Pt - PtI/(NtP,t(l - Pt)) (13) D---2
 (14) GC -= EtEkENkNIjP,k - Pt
 (N2EP,(1 - P,))
 35 See Otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan (1955),
 Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1988), and Sean Rear-
 don (1998). The dissimilarity index is the most widely used
 segregation measure. It shows the proportion of individuals
 who would have to change communities to create an evenly
 distributed population, expressed as a ratio of the number
 who would have to move if the types were completely
 segregated. The Gini coefficient generalizes the dissimilar-
 ity index. The main difference is that the Gini is sensitive to
 any change in the population distribution whereas the dis-
 similarity index is affected only by shifts in types between
 "surplus" and "deficit" communities.
 36 More formally, suppose that each group reproduces at
 a different rate and that the offspring live in the same
 community as the parents. If there are two groups, then both
 indices are invariant to the group growth rates (proof avail-
 able upon request).
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 where Nj is the total population in com-
 munity j, N is the total population, Ptj is the
 share of type t in the community j's popula-
 tion, and Pt is the share of type t in the total
 population.
 We also employ entropy indices, which are
 additively separable and can be used to perform
 within- and between-region decompositions.
 Formally, let Pj be the share of the total popu-
 lation living in j. The community-level entropy
 index is,
 (15)  E I - jPjHjH-1
 where Hj = -tPtlog(Ptj), H = -tPtlog(P,).
 If a type t is absent from community j, then by
 convention, Pjlog(Pj) = 0. The between- and
 within-region decomposition is,
 (16)
 E -EBetween + EWithin
 = (1 - RPRHRH-1)
 + YRPRHRH- (1 - _jERPjRHjHR )
 where R is the region; PR is the share of the total
 population living in R; PjR is the share of the
 region R's population living inj; PtR is the share
 of type t in region R's population; and HR =
 -]tPtRlog(PtR).
 The heterogeneity measures for income are richer
 because the data is in ordered categories. The
 aggregate income distribution can be decomposed
 into within- and between-community components
 using the two additively-separable Theil measures,
 (17) I1- -ljPjsPsjY,sjlog(tsj4/ij)
 + t l~jPj.,jlog(Lj/tx)
 (18)
 I2 - jPjsPsjlog(,j/sj) + jPjlog(p,/pj)
 where pUj is the mean income, Pjs is now the
 proportion of individuals in income group s, gsj is
 the mean income of group s, all for community j,
 and ,L is the aggregate mean income (Anthony F.
 Shorrocks, 1980). In the formulae, the first term
 is the within-component and the second term is
 the between-component. To investigate within-
 community heterogeneity further, we also con-
 sider the Gini income coefficient and the CV.
 Because the available data is grouped in income
 ranges, both lower- and upper-bound Gini's are
 computed for each community j,
 (19) GLj- (2,j)-' s,tPsjPls- -l,S |
 (20) GUj--GLj + (Ijj)-lsPs2j( - s- )
 X (as - t,sj)(as - as- )-1
 where as is the upper-income boundary for in-
 come group s (see Joseph Gastwirth, 1972).
 IV. Trends in Heterogeneity Across Municipalities
 A. National Sample of Municipalities
 We first consider local policy outcomes for
 our national sample of municipalities (MCDs)
 and calculate our two heterogeneity measures,
 the coefficient of variation (CV) and the reallo-
 cation index (DG). Panel (a) of Table 1 presents
 heterogeneity trends for per capita taxes across
 municipalities over the 1880-1992 period. Dis-
 persion between MCDs markedly decreased
 over the sample. The values in 1992 are roughly
 half of their 1880 values. Panel (b) shows the
 long-run reduction in dispersion of school dis-
 trict taxes is even more dramatic. While there
 has been a mild divergence in school district
 taxes between 1972 and 1992, the current
 dispersion levels are well below those prevail-
 ing a century ago. The remaining panels (c)-(e)
 have current operations spending data for the
 modem period, 1972-1992. There are small re-
 ductions in across-MCD heterogeneity for over-
 all spending per capita. Dispersion also falls for
 the two most prominent local expenditure cate-
 gories-protection (police plus fire) spending
 per capita, and school district education spend-
 ing per pupil.37
 37 Given that samples are used, it is best not to read too
 much into these small reductions in the contemporary data.
 Still, the results suggest there is no trend towards greater
 spending heterogeneity.
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 TABLE 1-DISPERSION OF LOCAL POLICIES: ACROSS-MCD/SCHOOL DISTRICT AND ACROSS-COUNTY INDICES
 (a) Municipal Per Capita Taxes
 MCD (municipal)-level Aggregated to county-level
 Year N CV DG N CV DG
 1880 634 1.738 0.537 239 1.353 0.412
 1890 968 1.321 0.349 268 0.793 0.307
 1972 3,175 1.100 0.347 304 0.762 0.259
 1982 3,196 0.864 0.311 305 0.703 0.224
 1992 3,251 0.844 0.295 305 0.622 0.207
 (b) School District Per Capita Taxes
 School district-level Aggregated to county-level
 Year N CV DG N CV DG
 1880 634 2.093 0.796 239 0.759 0.313
 1890 968 0.974 0.289 268 0.730 0.275
 1972 1,352 0.573 0.216 275 0.504 0.202
 1982 1,193 0.675 0.246 276 0.568 0.207
 1992 1,221 0.696 0.264 276 0.571 0.218
 (c) Total Spending (Current Operations) Per Capita
 MCD (municipal)-level Aggregated to county-level
 Year N CV DG N CV DG
 1972 3,171 1.003 0.357 304 0.654 0.244
 1982 3,177 0.847 0.304 305 0.503 0.192
 1992 3,271 0.778 0.285 305 0.463 0.184
 (d) Protection Spending (Current Operations) Per Capita
 MCD (municipal)-level Aggregated to county-level
 Year N CV DG N CV DG
 1972 1,906 0.721 0.261 303 0.512 0.202
 1982 2,257 0.603 0.229 305 0.470 0.188
 1992 2,336 0.607 0.225 305 0.435 0.179
 (e) Education Spending (Current Operations) Per Student Enrollment
 School district-level Aggregated to county-level
 Year N CV DG N CV DG
 1972 1,346 0.253 0.091 275 0.232 0.085
 1982 1,191 0.241 0.090 276 0.237 0.084
 1992 1,225 0.217 0.080 276 0.220 0.077
 Notes: The coefficient of variation, CV, is defined in equation (11) of Section III; the reallocation index, DG, is defined in
 equation (12). These values are based on a 1-in-10 sample of all municipalities, which is further described in the online Data
 Appendix. County-level taxes/spending are the sum of all municipal taxes/spending plus any county taxes/spending.
 We next consider the available preference
 proxies: race, nativity, and age. To measure
 the dispersion of these proxies across munic-
 ipalities we employ the dissimilarity index
 (D). Table 2 shows that heterogeneity across
 MCDs for each of the three public good prox-
 ies is lower in 1990 than in 1930, or where
 available in 1870. The dissimilarity index for
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 TABLE 2-DISPERSION OF PREFERENCE PROXIES: ACROSs-MCD AND ACROSS-COUNTY DISSIMILARITY INDICES
 Racial composition (black) Nativity (foreign-born)
 Aggregated to Aggregated to
 Year N MCD-level county-level N MCD-level county-level
 1870 2,071 0.724 0.697 2,071 0.559 0.511
 1930 5,071 0.650 0.615 5,070 0.503 0.491
 1960 3,798 0.510 0.477
 1970 3,020 0.528 0.499 3,039 0.476 0.447
 1980 3,453 0.564 0.520 3,415 0.470 0.458
 1990 3,456 0.572 0.525 3,456 0.482 0.465
 Young population Old population
 Aggregated to Aggregated to
 Year N MCD-level county-level N MCD-level county-level
 1930 5,071 0.106 0.087 5,071 0.182 0.161
 1960 3,798 0.086 0.064 3,798 0.149 0.121
 1970 3,275 0.073 0.045 3,275 0.169 0.136
 1980 3,415 0.069 0.068 3,415 0.175 0.145
 1990 3,456 0.073 0.054 3,456 0.176 0.147
 Notes: The dissimilarity index is defined in equation (13) of Section III. The sample size (N) refers to the number of MCDs.
 Empty cells indicate missing data. These results are based on a 1-in-10 sample. Full details of the data as well as precise
 definition of the categories are in the online Data Appendix.
 racial composition declines by a fifth between
 1870 and 1990 while the index for nativity
 falls by a seventh over the same period. There
 is also a substantial reduction between 1930
 and 1990 in the heterogeneity of the young
 population while there is a U-shaped pattern
 for the elderly population. The latter is par-
 ticularly noteworthy because it runs counter
 to the tremendous growth of retirement com-
 munities in Florida and Arizona. Again the
 lesson from the preference proxy data is that
 any small increases in heterogeneity across
 MCDs over the recent decades should not
 mislead us; in general, the long-run historical
 trends indicate convergence.
 These results are in conflict with the Tiebout
 prediction that greater across-community strat-
 ification should accompany reductions in mo-
 bility costs. The data indicate that as moving
 became easier municipalities actually become
 more similar in their residential composition
 and local policy outcomes. Indeed, the conver-
 gence between MCDs was strongest in the early
 period when the decline in mobility costs ap-
 pears most rapid. These findings suggest some
 alternative incentives, working in direct oppo-
 sition to Tiebout, have been dominating resi-
 dential loca ion choices.
 Such long-run mobility trends have had im-
 portant effects on community composition. Two
 pieces of evidence reveal that there is substan-
 tial population heterogeneity within contempo-
 rary municipalities. First, consider the entropy
 measure of racial heterogeneity across all Cen-
 sus tracts in the United States.38 Given the
 entropy index is additively separable, this sta-
 tistic can be decomposed into within- and
 between-MCD components. In 1980 the total
 entropy index of racial composition across all
 Census tracts is 0.546 (N = 99,935), whereas the
 within-MCD component is 0.253. This means
 the racial heterogeneity across tracts within a
 38 Census tracts are the smallest geographic unit with
 complete coverage of the United States in 1980 (the smaller
 Census block only covered MCDs with population exceed-
 ing 10,000). The Census considers tracts to be equivalent to
 neighborhoods. Full details on the definition and evolu-
 tion of these units is presented in U.S. Bureau of the
 Census (1994), Geographic Areas Reference Manual (http://
 www.census.gov), while the data are discussed in the online
 Data Appendix.
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 municipality is about equal to the heterogeneity
 across municipalities.39 Second, we can decom-
 pose the national family income dispersion into
 Theil within- and between-MCD components.
 Using all MCDs in 1969 (N = 34,842), the total
 Theill index is 0.265 while the within-MCD
 component is 0.229; in 1979 (N = 34,809), the
 total index is 0.250 while the within-component
 is 0.222; in 1989 (N = 35,065), the total index
 is 0.288 while the within-component is 0.243.
 This finding means that income heterogeneity
 within MCDs is quite high, contributing over
 four-fifths to the total dispersion. The Tiebout
 prediction of homogeneous communities ap-
 pears to be a poor approximation for contem-
 porary municipalities.
 B. Boston Metropolitan Area
 In addition to the national sample, we repli-
 cated and extended our analysis using the 92
 municipalities in the Boston SMSA (1980 def-
 inition). This area provides an attractive test
 case for several reasons. Boston has been in-
 tensely studied and is often put forward as the
 archetype of the Tiebout model. Municipalities
 are the only important local government and
 directly provide all high-profile public services
 such as education and protection. There is also
 clear evidence of a secular decline in intra-
 Boston SMSA transportation costs.40 The area
 has been fully incorporated with only minor
 border changes throughout the study period,
 so we can compare the same set of communi-
 ties. Detailed data are available for the Boston
 area dating back to the late-nineteenth century.
 It is also possible to perform an event analysis
 and see whether changes in the policy environ-
 ment, such as the introduction of property tax
 39 While this result is partly driven by central cities,
 when the sample is restricted to MCDs with population
 less than 50,000 or to those with less than ten tracts the
 within-MCD component still contributes 20 percent of
 the total. It is worth noting that these figures likely
 understate within-MCD heterogeneity since the average
 MCD has only 3.25 tracts (53 percent of MCDs have only one
 tract meaning their within-component is calculated as zero).
 40 For example, see the discussion of the development of
 the Boston mass transit system in George Sanborn, The Chron-
 icle of the Boston Transit System (http://www.mbta.com).
 limits in 1980 and of mandatory busing in Bos-
 t n in 1974, are driving stratification patterns.
 Fi ally, as with many other metro areas there
 has been a dramatic shift of population from the
 city to the suburbs, with Boston's population
 share dropping from 40 to 20 percent between
 1915 and 1990. This shift will itself lead to
 greater measured stratification.41
 Figure 3 shows across-municipality heter-
 ogeneity trends for various political and
 demographic proxies for public good prefer-
 ences over the 1855-1990 period. For one
 index, the black population share, there is
 greater sorting at the end of the period than at
 the beginning. This trend, which is consistent
 with Cutler et al.'s (1999) findings for a large
 number of cities over 1890-1990, fits the
 standard picture of "white flight" in response
 to the Great Migration of African-Americans
 to northern metro areas. But we should be
 careful not to generalize from this observation
 into a wholesale acceptance of the Tiebout
 model. First, as Cutler et al. (1999) note, the
 trend toward increased concentration reverses
 after 1970. Second, the rise was entirely due
 to city-suburb differences: Figure 3 also
 shows that segregation of blacks within the
 suburbs has changed little or if anything has
 declined, over the sample period. Moreover it
 is not clear that growing racial concentration
 within an urban area should be attributed to
 Tiebout sorting but rather could result from
 racism.42 Consistent with this view, in 1950
 and 1960 over two-thirds of the between-tract
 racial heterogeneity under the entropy mea-
 sure is due to within-municipality dispersion
 (even excluding Boston, the within-munici-
 pality heterogeneity contribution is about
 41 All of our measures of heterogeneity across communities
 will increase under the following thought experiment: suppose
 the center city has a relatively heterogeneous population and is
 surrounded by more homogeneous, but distinctive suburbs.
 Then a representative set of city dwellers move to the suburbs
 in such a way that no municipality (including the central city)
 changes its population composition.
 42 Cutler et al. (1999) uses evidence from housing mar-
 kets to stress the role of racial discrimination. Such a sorting
 mechanism will upset a Tiebout equilibrium, since attitudes
 concerning one's neighbor's race are not likely to coincide
 perfectly with public good preferences.
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 FIGURE 3. DEMOGRAPHIC HETEROGENEITY ACROSS MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS
 IN THE BOSTON SMSA (DISSIMIARITY INDEX)
 Notes: Year (sample size): 1855 (79), 1865 (79), 1875 (88), 1885 (90), 1895 (91; 90 for
 Foreign-Born), 1905 (92), 1915 (92), 1930 (92), 1940 (92), 1950 (75), 1960 (83; 92 for Race),
 1970 (91; 92 for Race), 1980 (92), 1990 (92). Presidential vote share is every four years
 (1868-1988) and includes 92 MCDs.
 half).43 A final reason not to leap from racial
 segregation trends to a wholesale acceptance
 of the Tiebout model is that none of the
 other preference proxies (vote shares, young,
 foreign-born) shows significant movement to
 greater sorting over the past century and a
 half. (Foreign-born heterogeneity did increase
 in the post-World War II period, but this
 represented a return to the levels of the 1855-
 1875 period.) Indeed, the party vote shares in
 presidential elections indicate reduced heter-
 ogeneity across Boston municipalities over
 the last 50 years.
 The income data also reveal little sign of greater
 sorting. If individuals are becoming increasingly
 Tiebout sorted, then income inequality within-mu-
 nicipalities should fall and inequality between-
 municipalities should rise. Table 3 shows trends
 in household income heterogeneity over the
 43 Again the idea is that tracts are neighborhoods. Under
 a racism model individuals have preferences over who they
 interact with, and so neighborhoods are greatly stratified. In
 the Tiebout model there should be no stratification across
 neighborhoods within a municipality since each neighbor-
 hood receives the same level of public services.
 1949-1989 period. We first create two within-
 MCD measures by calculating a CV and Gini
 index for the income distribution in each MCD
 and then average the MCD values using by
 population weights. The data in the left panel
 show that the average within-MCD income het-
 erogeneity has stayed roughly constant. This
 means the income distribution within each mu-
 nicipality has not changed much over the post-
 World War II period. The right panel examines
 trends in within- and between-MCD income
 heterogeneity using additively-separable Theil
 indices. These indices reveal the within- and
 between-components have changed little. More-
 over, the between-component is quite small
 (less than a fifth of the within-component) which
 means almost all income heterogeneity is due to
 within-municipality diversity. Municipalities in
 the Boston area have strikingly similar income
 distributions and there has been little movement
 towards greater sorting over the last 50 years.
 Nor is there evidence of increasing long-run
 heterogeneity of government policies across
 the MCDs of the Boston SMSA. Table
 4 charts the trends in the key series over the
 1906-1992 period. Although there has been a
 U.UU . U.W
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 TABLE 3-HOUSEHOLD INCOME HETEROGENEITY WITHIN- AND BETWEEN-MCDS IN THE BOSTON SMSA
 Within-indices Within-/between-decomposition
 Year N CV GL GU I - W I, - B I2 - W I2- B
 1949 74 0.805 0.404 0.414 0.290 0.041 0.386 0.033
 (0.090) (0.043) (0.044)
 1979 92 0.788 0.394 0.398 0.261 0.041 0.316 0.039
 (0.106) (0.039) (0.039)
 1989 92 0.809 0.407 0.413 0.279 0.040 0.349 0.038
 (0.105) (0.040) (0.039)
 Notes: The coefficient of variation, CV, is defined in equation (11) of Section III. The Gini indices, GL and GU, are defined
 in equations (19) and (20), respectively. The Theil indices, I1 and I2 are defined in equations (17) and (18). The "W' is
 within-MCD, and "B" is between-MCD. The within-measures are population-weighted averages of each of the MCD indices.
 Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the within-measures.
 There is no electronic data available prior to 1979 for households. The results for households in 1979 and 1989 are similar
 if MCDs which are missing data in 1949 are omitted.
 Results for families are not reported since there is no family-level data in the 1949 hardcopies (see the online Data
 Appendix for details). The family-level indices are quite similar to the household-level indices for 1979 and 1989.
 To compute the indices, we need to know for each MCD the proportion of people in each income category and the mean
 income in each group. Because the latter is unavailable, the midpoint of each income interval was used as the mean. For the
 top-coded income group, a mean of 1.5 times the lower bound was used (several other values were considered and the results
 do not appear to be sensitive to this choice). For the Gini measures the upper and lower bound of each income interval is also
 needed. For the upper bound of the top-coded group, 20 times the lower bound was used (again the results are robust to using
 other values for the top-coded group).
 small increase since the 1960's, the population-
 weighted CV of total government spending,
 measured by the per capita current operation
 budget, fell by a quarter between 1906 and
 1992. We also investigate two major spending
 categories, protection and education, which
 typically comprise over one-half of total
 spending in these data. The CV for per capita
 protection spending fell by 30 percent over the
 past century. The CV for per capita education
 spending rose and then fell; the endpoint is
 roughly equal to the starting point. These
 measures display considerable variability, but
 there is no observed long-run tendency for the
 policy CVs to rise as the model predicts. This
 finding reinforces the results for the national
 sample.
 44 There is a spike in education spending heterogeneity
 across MCDs in the 1960's which stems from Boston's
 relative reduction in education spending. Seymour Sacks
 (1972) documents that most urban school districts reduced
 spending relative to their suburban counterparts during this
 period. The elimination of the urban-suburban spending gap
 by the mid-1970's can likely be linked to costs associated
 with forced busing in Boston (see J. Brian Sheehan, 1984)
 and changes in the state school aid formula (see Steven
 Weiss, 1970).
 In conclusion, desp te the urban flight from
 the heterogeneous central city, there is little
 evidence of increased sorting between munici-
 paliti s i  the Boston SMSA. The only measure
 giving clear evidence of growing concentration
 is ra i l composition between the city and sub-
 urbs, nd this is likely due to racial discrimina-
 tion rather than Tiebout sorting. In fact among
 the demographic variabl s we consider none
 ever exceeds the conventional standard of
 hig  heterogene ty (a dissimilarity index
 above 0.6). The population of the Boston
 SMSA ppears to be far from the level of
 sorting that Tiebout would predict. Finally,
 changes in the disper ion of the spending
 variables or any of the preference proxies are
 not strongly linked to changes in the policy
 environment such as school busing in the 1970's
 or tax limits in the 1980's.
 V. Trends in Heterogeneity Across Counties
 We can gain a better understanding of
 trends in geographic heterogeneity by exam-
 ining the more abundant county-level data. Em-
 pirically trends in across-county heterogeneity
 closely mirror trends in across-municipality
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 TABLE 4-AcRoSS-MCD CURRENT OPERATIONS SPENDING
 IN THE BOSTON SMSA: COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATIONS (CV)
 Year N GTotal Gprotection GEducation
 1906 92 0.359 0.490 0.197
 1913 92 0.297 0.402 0.218
 1923 92 0.267 0.351 0.203
 1932 92 0.281 0.346 0.181
 1942 92 0.220 0.297 0.160
 1955 92 0.236 0.350 0.190
 1962 59 0.189 0.311 0.311
 1967 59 0.216 0.281 0.356
 1972 92 0.293 0.399 0.267
 1977 92 0.242 0.365 0.177
 1982 92 0.233 0.276 0.206
 1987 92 0.243 0.334 0.187
 1992 92 0.267 0.340 0.194
 Notes: See the online Data Appendix for a list of sources
 and definitions of these series. The coefficient of varia-
 tion, CV, is defined in equation (11). All values are
 population-weighted. In 1962 and 1967 there are no
 values reported for the 33 municipalities which have
 populations less than 10,000. The CV's in the remaining
 years do not change significantly when these 33 munic-
 ipalities are omitted (because the measure is population-
 weighted and these are all small communities).
 heterogeneity.45 For example, Table 2 shows
 that the racial dissimilarity index at the
 county-level is approximately the MCD-level
 index shifted down by a constant. Similar
 parallels between MCD- and county-level
 trends are evident for: (i) the other proxies in
 Table 2; (ii) the tax and spending results in
 Table 1 ;46 (iii) all the proxies and local policy
 outcomes using the full national set of MCDs
 over 1970-1990 (results omitted); (iv) all the
 variables from the Boston SMSA (see Rhode
 and Strumpf, 2000).47
 45 We believe that Tiebout sorting should also apply to
 counties. In Rhode and Strumpf (2000) we show that coun-
 ties play an important role in providing local services and
 that reduced sorting of type proxies occurs even in states
 where counties have major fiscal responsibilities.
 46 Table 1 also indicates there is substantial within-
 county heterogeneity in MCD/school district taxes or spend-
 ing. However, the between-county differences are even
 larger and typically on the order of two-thirds the overall
 MCD dispersion.
 47 The Boston results are of interest since the counties of
 Massachusetts have few fiscal responsibilities, and so there
 is likely to be a divergence if subcounty Tiebout sorting is
 the driving factor in residential choice.
 A more formal demonstration employs the
 MCD-level entropy index, which can be de-
 composed into within- and between-county
 components. Table 5, which contains results
 for a wide variety of preference proxies,
 shows that the decline in overall heterogene-
 ity between MCDs is almost entirely driven
 by reductions in heterogeneity between coun-
 ties. The within-county heterogeneity remains
 roughly constant and small. For example, the
 within-component contributes less than a fifth
 to the racial composition index and less than
 a third to the family income index. All these
 results suggest that computing heterogeneity
 trends across counties yields a reasonable ap-
 proximation to heterogeneity trends between
 MCDs, the more typical unit for Tiebout com-
 munities. We therefore consider the far more
 abundant data for all U.S. counties over the
 1850-1990 period.48
 The available evidence reveals that the
 variation in local policy outcomes across
 counties fell dramatically over time. Perhaps
 the most prominent category is education.
 The top panel of Table 6 shows that the
 dispersion across counties of per capita
 spending (including all direct education ex-
 penditures within the county boundaries)
 steadily falls by more than 50 percent be-
 tween 1890 and 1992. The second set of local
 policy outcomes includes real per capita taxes
 and revenues. Due to data availability prob-
 lems, we use four different variables: Tax1,
 taxes collected by counties; Tax2, taxes col-
 lected by all local governments within the
 county; Revl, revenues collected by counties;
 and Rev2, revenues collected by all local gov-
 ernments within the county.49 The bottom
 panel of Table 6 shows a sharp drop in dis-
 persion across counties of all these variables
 over the 1870-1992 period. Although there
 48 Whenever possible the sample includes all counties in
 existence in a given year and the annual sample sizes are
 presented in the tables and figures discussed below. Alaska
 is omitted due to inconsistencies in its county codes.
 49 The main difference between taxes and revenues is
 intergovernmental grants, which were typically small before
 1945.
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 TABLE 5-WITHIN-COUNTY/BETWEEN-COUNTY DECOMPOSITION OF THE MCD-LEVEL ENTROPY INDEX
 Racial composition (black) Nativity (foreign-born)
 MCD Within- Between- MCD Within- Between-
 Year N total county county N total county county
 1870 2,071 0.453 0.041 0.411 2,071 0.255 0.033 0.222
 1930 5,071 0.374 0.051 0.323 5,070 0.207 0.011 0.196
 1960 3,798 0.252 0.041 0.211
 1970 3,020 0.246 0.044 0.202 3,039 0.160 0.016 0.144
 1980 3,453 0.274 0.044 0.230 3,415 0.166 0.010 0.156
 1990 3,456 0.293 0.055 0.237 3,456 0.187 0.013 0.174
 Young population Old population
 MCD Within- Between- MCD Within- Between-
 Year N total county county N total county county
 1930 5,071 0.012 0.004 0.008 5,071 0.026 0.008 0.018
 1960 3,798 0.008 0.002 0.005 3,798 0.026 0.008 0.018
 1970 3,275 0.007 0.003 0.004 3,275 0.035 0.011 0.024
 1980 3,415 0.007 0.003 0.004 3,415 0.034 0.010 0.024
 1990 3,456 0.007 0.003 0.004 3,456 0.034 0.012 0.023
 Education Homeowner occupation
 MCD Within- Between- MCD Within- Between-
 Year N total county county N total county county
 1970 3,275 0.045 0.014 0.031
 1980 3,415 0.042 0.011 0.032 3,422 0.102 0.023 0.080
 1990 3,455 0.047 0.011 0.033 3,456 0.098 0.029 0.070
 Family income: Theill-between Family income: Theil2-between
 MCD Within- Between- MCD Within- Between-
 Year N total county county N total county county
 1969 3,275 0.029 0.007 0.022 3,275 0.028 0.007 0.021
 1979 3,415 0.024 0.006 0.018 3,415 0.022 0.006 0.017
 1989 3,456 0.037 0.011 0.025 3,456 0.034 0.010 0.024
 Notes: The overall-, within-, and between-entropy terms are defined in equations (15) and (16) of Section III. Empty cells
 indicate missing data. These results are based on a 1-in-10 sample. Full details of the data as well as precise definition of the
 categories are in the online Data Appendix.
 has been a slight increase in recent decades,
 the CV for Tax2 fell by nearly one-half be-
 tween 1870 and 1992. All of these results
 are robust to controlling for outliers, state
 fixed effects, and returns to scale in govern-
 ment services (see Rhode and Strumpf,
 2000).
 Heterogeneity across counties of the pref-
 erence proxies remains flat or falls over the
 sample. Figure 4 plots the dissimilarity and
 Gini indices for presidential votes in elections
 between 1848 and 1988. (To register the im-
 portance of third parties, the figure also shows
 the two-party vote share.) There is a gradual
 downward trend, especially after 1892.50 For
 example, the Gini trend line has a slope of
 50 The 1860 election was highly unusual because four
 major parties-Republicans, Democrats, Southern Demo-
 crats, and Constitutional Unionists-participated in the sec-
 tionally divided contest.
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 TABLE 6-DISPERSION OF LOCAL POLICIES ACROSS COUNTIES
 Per Capita Education Spending
 Year N CV DG
 1890 2,623 0.663 0.212
 1932 3,084 0.487 0.183
 1957 3,091 0.335 0.124
 1962 3,103 0.302 0.116
 1967 3,102 0.285 0.104
 1972 3,106 0.297 0.109
 1977 3,110 0.270 0.103
 1982 3,110 0.251 0.087
 1987 3,110 0.247 0.084
 1992 3,112 0.249 0.089
 Per Capita Taxes and Revenues
 CV DG
 Year N Taxl Tax2 Revl Rev2 Tax, Tax2 Revl Rev2
 1870 2,098 1.179 0.933 0.349 0.338
 1880 2,302 0.878 0.889 0.282 0.327
 1890 1,308 1.015 0.364
 1902 2,679 0.745 0.297
 1913 2,902 0.868 0.338
 1922 3,024 0.695 0.255
 1932 3,083 0.677 0.473 0.640 0.463 0.248 0.191 0.234 0.187
 1942 2,497 0.689 0.755 0.261 0.258
 1957 3,087 0.373 0.150
 1962 3,093 0.464 0.346 0.192 0.139
 1967 3,095 0.467 0.385 0.187 0.143
 1972 3,097 0.485 0.419 0.197 0.159
 1977 3,104 0.524 0.421 0.206 0.154
 1982 3,103 0.503 0.363 0.183 0.134
 1987 3,104 0.522 0.372 0.187 0.137
 1992 3,104 0.497 0.350 0.182 0.129
 Notes: The coefficient of variation, CV, is defined in equation (11) of Section III; the reallocation index, DG, is defined in
 equation (12).
 For the top panel, the G variables involve education spending. For the bottom panel, the G's are taxes or revenues (GI =
 just county government G; G2 = county + subcounty government G). Empty cells are due to missing data. See the online
 Data Appendix for further details about the data.
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 FIGURE. 4. HETEROGENEITY OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE SHARES ACROSS U.S. COUNTIES
 Note: Year (sample size): 1852 (1,551), 1860 (1,864), 1872 (2,177), 1880 (2,315), 1892
 (2,667), 1900 (2,730), 1912 (2,970), 1920 (3,031), 1932 (3,091), 1940 (3,067), 1952 (3,097),
 1960 (3,101), 1972 (3,105), 1980 (3,111), 1988 (3,113).
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 FIGURE 5. HETEROGENEITY IN BLACK POPULATION SHARE ACROSS U.S. COUNTIES
 Note: Year (sample size): 1850 (1,596), 1860 (2,030), 1870 (2,185), 1880 (2,400), 1890
 (2,743), 1900 (2,777), 1910 (2,950), 1920 (3,064), 1930 (3,100), 1940 (3,097), 1950 (3,100),
 1960 (3,108), 1970 (3,111), 1980 (3,114), 1990 (3,116).
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 FIGURE 6. HETEROGENEITY OF RELIGION DENOMINATIONAL SHARES,
 HOMEOWNERSHIP, AND EDUCATION ACROSS U.S. COUNTIES
 Notes: Year (sample size with R denoting religious data): 1890 (2,753, R: 2,677), 1900
 (2,825), 1906 (R: 2,767), 1910 (2,949), 1916 (R: 2,948), 1920 (3,064), 1926 (R: 3,064), 1930
 (3,100), 1936 (R: 3,096), 1940 (3,097), 1950 (3,099), 1952 (R: 3,072), 1960 (3,103), 1970
 (3,109), 1971 (R: 3,077), 1980 (2,753, R: 3,068), 1990 (3,110, R: 3,080). Unaffiliated and
 affiliates of minor denominations are excluded.
 pattern.5 Our investigation of county-level
 net migration patterns over the 1930-1980
 period confirms these findings.52
 The data on religious affiliation, displayed in
 Figure 6, reveal counties have become more
 alike over the past century. (The convergence is
 more apparent if one extrapolates back using
 data on church seating by denominations for the
 5' Our results complement Cutler et al. (1999) who find that
 black urban segregation increased from 1890 to 1970 and then
 sharply declined. These contrasting results are likely due to the
 differences in the scope and level of spatial aggregation of the
 two analyses. They consider segregation within a city at the
 census-tract level whereas we are looking at all of the counties
 in the United States. Their analysis captures within-city heter-
 ogeneity while our data largely measures differences across
 urban and rural areas. So while the black rural-urban migra-
 tion tended to reduce heterogeneity at the county level, it
 increased heterogeneity within cities if new black migrants
 tended to live in disproportionately black census tracts.
 52 In regressions both with and without controls for the
 South, black net migration rates have a negative and statis-
 tically significant relationship with the black population
 share (results omitted). That is, blacks disproportionately
 left counties where they were overrepresented. These results
 run counter not only to Tiebout sorting, but also to expla-
 nations for declined heterogeneity based on purely random
 movement.
 1850-1890 period; see Rhode and Strumpf,
 2000.) Figure 6 also shows the declining trends
 in heterogeneity across counties for homeown-
 ership and education levels. The homeowner-
 ship indices each fall almost in half over the
 1890-1990 period while the education indices
 decline slightly between 1940 and 1990.
 Figure 7 presents county-level data for the
 age groups and the foreign-born. The heteroge-
 neity indices for the young population share
 have no strong trend, though dispersion clearly
 falls in the post-World War II period. In this
 same period there is a slight growth in the
 heterogeneity of the old, but this is swamped by
 the reduction since 1850.53 For the foreign-born
 share, there is a slight downward trend in
 across-county heterogeneity over the whole
 sample but a noticeable rise between 1960-
 1990 (which is due to the disproportion-
 ately rapid growth of Hispanic immigrants in
 53 While there is no county-level data for the elderly
 between 1870 and 1920, we were able to compile a state-
 level time series over the period 1870-1970. The dissimi-
 larity index computed from this data falls continuously,
 particularly during the period where we have no county
 data.
 0.8 - - --
 O.00
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 FIGURE 7. HETEROGENEITY OF FOREIGN-BORN, YOUNG, AND
 OLD POPULATION SHARES ACROSS U.S. COUNTIES
 Notes: Year (sample size): 1850 (1,607), 1860 (2,055), 1870 (2,230), 1880 (2,421), 1890
 (2,780), 1900 (2,832), 1910 (2,955), 1920 (3,071), 1930 (3,102), 1940 (3,099), 1950 (3,102),
 1960 (3,114), 1970 (3,112), 1980 (3,115), 1990 (3,117). There is no county-level data for the
 old population share between 1870 and 1920. For foreign-born, 1850, 1860: includes entire
 population; 1910-1930: white only; 1950: 21 years and over.
 California, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and
 New York). Finally, Table 7 presents family
 and household income inequality/heterogeneity
 measures for 1949, 1969, 1979, and 1989. Par-
 alleling the results for the Boston SMSA, within-
 county heterogeneity has stayed roughly con-
 stant while the between-county component
 is relatively small and declined between 1949
 and 1979 before increasing slightly over the
 1980's. Income groups have not become more
 sorted.
 These results reinforce and extend the MCD-
 level analysis. There has been measurable con-
 vergence across counties in a wide range of
 local policies and resident public good prefer-
 ences over the last 150 years. These findings are
 in conflict with the prediction of the generalized
 Tiebout model since mobility costs have fallen
 over this period.
 VI. Conclusion
 This paper evaluates the empirical relevance
 of Tiebout sorting. Local public goods undoubt-
 edly influence residential choice, but our evidence
 indicates that other factors have overwhelmed
 Tiebout sorting in the long run. The augmented
 Tiebout model predicts greater heterogeneity
 across communities in both resident preferences
 and government policies as movement becomes
 easier. Because of the secular decline in mobil-
 ity costs, there should be a trend towards greater
 stratification. However, we find little evidence
 that the Tiebout mechanism played a dominant
 role in sorting over the last 150 years. In fact a
 wide variety of preference and policy variables
 indicate that communities (as measured by mu-
 nicipalities and counties) have become more
 alike.
 These results provide an important challenge
 for future local public economics research. We
 need to determine which alternative motives
 empirically explain long-run residential choices
 and then incorporate them into our theoretical
 models. Such revised models will likely have
 implications that sharply contrast with those
 from the Tiebout model. This calls into question
 the literature that adopts a rigid Tiebout frame-
 U.vU
 0.ll
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 TABLE 7-INCOME HETEROGENEITY WITHIN- AND BETWEEN-COUNTIES
 Within-indices Within-/between-decomposition
 Year N CV GL GU I1 - W I1 - B 12- W 12- B
 Families 1949 311 0.808 0.390 0.396 0.261 0.031 0.327 0.035
 (0.132) (0.046) (0.047)
 1969 311 0.815 0.378 0.386 0.254 0.022 0.291 0.021
 (0.098) (0.034) (0.033)
 1979 311 0.776 0.376 0.379 0.244 0.018 0.284 0.017
 (0.075) (0.031) (0.031)
 1989 311 0.833 0.395 0.397 0.273 0.025 0.314 0.024
 (0.086) (0.036) (0.036)
 Households 1949 311 0.896 0.433 0.439 0.322 0.028 0.413 0.031
 (0.124) (0.039) (0.041)
 1979 311 0.857 0.414 0.417 0.294 0.018 0.346 0.017
 (0.074) (0.027) (0.027)
 1989 311 0.909 0.428 0.431 0.319 0.025 0.372 0.023
 (0.082) (0.030) (0.030)
 Notes: The coefficient of variation, CV, is defined in equation (11) of Section III. The Gini indices, GL and GU, are defined
 in equations (19) and (20), respectively. The Theil indices, I, and I2 are defined in equations (17) and (18). The "W" is
 within-counties, and "B" is between-counties. The within-measures are population-weighted averages of each of the county
 indices. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the within-measures.
 As described in the online Data Appendix, these values are based on a random, 1-in-10 sample. Household data for 1969
 is not available in electronic form.
 See Table 3 for additional comments.
 work to explain community composition and
 mobility choices. To illustrate this, we conclude
 by briefly discussing two alternative models
 which are more consistent with the data.54
 54 One obvious candidate, the growing federal role in
 providing public services, cannot be the complete explana-
 tion for our data. Centralization limits the benefit of sorting,
 say, by providing some minimum bundle of public goods.
 While this is consistent with a reduction in the rate of
 sorting, it does not explain the unsorting we observe. Non-
 Tiebout incentives for residential choice are also needed:
 centralization increases the relative importance of these
 factors.
 A second policy, zoning, also fails to explain the data.
 Bruce Hamilton (1975) argues that in the absence of zoning,
 poor individuals have incentives to move into high-income
 communities. This gives them access to the local public
 good at less than average cost, but also defeats the stratifi-
 cation that Tiebout predicts. With zoning, this poor-chasing-
 the-rich phenomenon could be avoided, say by imposing
 minimum lot sizes. Robert Nelson (1977) indicates zoning
 laws were almost entirely absent until the postwar period
 and they have grown in popularity over time. Hence the
 Tiebout model should be more appropriate today than in the
 past, and so the growth of zoning serves as an independent
 reason for a prediction of growing across-community
 heterogeneity.
 A final and more promising candidate is growing local
 First, suppose that individuals select commu-
 nities based on employment opportunities as
 well as local public goods. This would hold if
 residents receive an exogenous, community-
 specific net wage (the wage differential could
 stem from commuting costs or community-
 specific labor demands which reflect the
 complementarity of different skill types in pro-
 duction). Such a model is consistent with the
 reduction in sorting documented in this paper if
 employment has dispersed or if the relative im-
 portance of local public goods has fallen over
 time (for example, because of growth in the
 central provision of public services). However,
 in this model communities cannot be ranked
 according to public good preferences which is
 the canonical Tiebout result invoked by a large
 government competition. If some individuals are more de-
 sirable than others (say the rich), then in equilibrium com-
 munities adopt policies which are relatively favorable to
 these individuals (Nechyba, 1997, uses such an argument to
 explain the infrequency of local income taxes). This mech-
 anism offsets Tiebout because it limits policy heterogeneity
 across communities and thus reduces incentives for individ-
 ual sorting.
 VOL. 93 NO. 5  1673
 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
 number of papers in the local public economics
 literature. This critique holds more generally
 within the class of models where some other
 non-Tiebout migration motive has grown in im-
 portance (see footnote 16).
 Second, suppose we adopt the prevailing
 view in the empirical literature that Tiebout
 sorting occurs over a limited geographic area
 such as a metropolitan area. Under this model,
 Tiebout sorting within metro areas should in-
 crease because mobility costs have declined.
 This point can be reconciled with our finding
 f declining national heterogeneity across com-
 munities only if the metro areas have become
 more similar (i.e., between-metro heterogeneity
 has declined). This should imply growing pop-
 ulation diversity in the representative metro
 area. In fact, the average Herfindahl index
 of metro-area racial shares fell by over 10
 percent between 1930 and 1990. But given
 moving costs and nonpublic goods motives for
 residential choice, this growing local diversity
 inhibits widespread conformity with the
 Tiebout model.
 APPENDIX
 This Appendix contains the example of sorting with single-peaked preferences, and proofs of
 cases where sorting is associated with increased policy variation.
 EXAMPLE A: SORTING WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES
 A preliminary: define the initial level of variable X as X? and the level after one agent of type s
 moves as X1.
 Suppose individual preferences satisfy Assumption 1 and communities set their policies according







 G* - Gs < G*? - Gsl and G' - Gslj |G?* - Gsl;
 Us(G*') > Us(Gc?) and Us(Gl1) -< Us(G*?);
 Ut(G*l) ' Ut(G*?) V t such that sign(Gt - G*l) = sign(Gs - G*);
 Ut(G*l) ' Ut(G*?) V t such that sign(Gt - G*?) = -sign(Gs - G*?);
 Ut(Gcl) < Ut(Gc?) V t such that sign(G, - Go) = sign(Gs - G,?);
 Ut(G*l) < Ut(G*?) V t such that sign(Gt - Gl) =-sign(G - G).
 d ~ ~~~~~~~~~~G d ) ;
 To explain this example, we focus on the case for the receiving community because the case of the
 sending community is analogous. If public good provision is set by (2), the first-order condition
 tNtc,U(Gc*) = 0 must be satisfied, where Nt is the number of type t in community c. If one more
 person of type s moves in, holding the other Ntc constant, the weight on the Us(Gc) increases. Unless
 Us(G*?) = 0, the community must move G* closer to Gs to satisfy the new first-order condition. This
 increases the utility of type s and all types on the same side of G*1 as s and reduces the utility of all
 types on the other side of G*?. The inequalities are strict unless U[(G*?) = 0.
 PROOF OF THE OBSERVATION:
 Examples B and C provide conditions under which sorting is associated with increased variation
 of policy outcomes across communities.
 Example B: If preferences satisfy Assumption 1 and there are two communities and two types of
 individuals, then migration obeying (3) and (4) increases the differences between the communities'
 policies. Call the two communities c and d and the two types r and s, where Gr < Gs. Let Ni be the
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 total population of type i and let Nic be the number in community c. Given Nrc and Nsc, G* will be
 set where NrcUr(Gc) = -NscU[(G). Note that Ur(Gc) < 0 < Us(Gc) and that d[U](Gc)/(- U'(GC*))]/
 dG* < 0. By the implicit function theorem, we can solve for G* = H[NrcNsc] where H' < 0, H[O] =
 Gs and H[oo] = Gr. By a similar argument, G* = H[(Nr - Nrc)/(Ns - Nsc)]. If Nrc/Nsc > N1/N2, then
 Gr - G* < G* - Gs. Community c will be the preferred community for type r and community d
 for type s. Migration obeying (3) and (4), which increases in Nrc and Nsd, causes greater segregation
 and widens the differences between the communities' policies: dijG - G*I/dNrc > 0 and diGs -
 G*/dNsd > 0.
 Example C: If preferences are quadratic as under Assumption 2, then any move obeying (3) and
 (4) increases the aggregate population-weighted variance of policies. Under (2) and Assumption 2,
 the policy in a given community is the mean of members' ideal policies and the aggregate
 population-weighted mean, X, is independent of the distribution of types across communities. An
 agent i of type s will move from community d (initially with NA members) to community c (with Nc
 members) if (G*? - Gs)2 + mi < (G*? - Gs)2. Such a move will change the policy in community
 d from Ga? to G* = (G?ANd - Gs)/(AN - 1) and that in c from G* to G* = (Gc*N?c + Gs)/
 (NAc + 1). Such a move will not affect the population-weighted mean of policies in c and d, i.e.,
 Nc?G*? + NdG*? = (Nc + 1)G*l + (NdA - 1)G*1. Nor will it change the aggregate mean or policies
 in communities other than c and d. But such a move does raise the population-weighted variances
 of policies:
 e[Ne(G* - x)2 - NO(G*? -X)2]/N
 = [(NC + 1)(GC)2 + (Nd - 1)(Gd1)2 - N(Gc) - (G
 - [(Nd/(Nd - 1))(G? - G)2 - (N/(N/? + 1))(G* - G )2]/N > 0
 where the inequality follows from (NC?/(Nc + 1)) < 1 < (Ndl(Nd - 1)) and (G*? - G )2 < (G*? -
 Gs)2.
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